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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The State in this case successfully sought criminal forfeiture of Ginger Key's car
after her plea of guilty to a charge of possession of marijuana in a quantity greater than
three ounces. Ms. Key timely appeals the district court's Order of Civil Forfeiture in this
case, and asserts that the provisions of I.C. 3 37-2801 and the procedures employed in
her case violated her constitutional rights to a jury trial; that there was insufficient
evidence that the car that Ms. Key was driving when she was arrested was used to
commit or facilitate her offense of possession of marijuana; and that the forfeiture of her
vehicle was unfairly disproportionate to her offense, and therefore worked a violation of
both the Eighth Amendment and I.C. § 37-2809.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ms. Key was charged with possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, and
possession of marijuana with intent to deliver where a child is present. (R., pp.16-17.)
The State subsequently amended these charges to include an additional charge of
possession of marijuana in an amount greater than three ounces. (R., pp.24-25.) All of
these charges arose from an allegation of a single act of possession of marijuana that
was alleged to have occurred "on or about July 13, 2007." (R., pp.5-7, 24.)
The State the filed notice of its intent to seek criminal forfeiture, pursuant to
I.C. 3 37-2801, etseq., of some of Ms. Key's property. (R., pp.26-27.) Specifically, the
State was seeking forfeiture of $2,100 that was found in Ms. Key's purse when she was
arrested and the car that she was driving at the time of her arrest. (R., pp.5-7,28-29.)

Prior to the time set for trial, the district court held a hearing to address the
motions to suppress and motions in limine filed by Ms. K ~ Y . '(Vol. 1 ~r.', p.; R., pp.3949.) At this hearing, the State presented testimony from two officers that participated in
the traffic stop and arrest that led to Ms. Key's criminal charges.3 (Vol. 1 Tr., p.10, L.3 -

According to the State's evidence, Officer Michael Chleboski was on patrol with
his drug dog, Gordo, in Elk City on the day that Ms. Key was arrested. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.10,
Ls.3-7; p.1 I , L.3 - p.12, L.5.) At approximately 4:30 in the afternoon, Officer Chleboski
was driving along Highway 14 when he saw a white Toyota Celica parked near the
entrance of an abandoned lumber mill. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.12, L.4 - p.14, L.8.) When he saw
the car parked near the side of the highway, Officer Chleboski turned his car around to
investigate the situation. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.14, Ls.9-14.)
As the officer approached the car, he saw two people in the front seat. (Vol. 1
Tr., p.14, L.22 - p.15, L.3.) The driver and passenger appeared to notice Officer

'

Because Ms. Key is only appealing from the district court's order of forfeiture in this
case, the specific bases of her pre-trial motions are not specifically discussed herein.
However, because the prosecutor in this case indicated that he was specifically relying
on the testimony introduced at this hearing in support of the State's forfeiture request,
the substance of these proceedings is presented in detail for this Court.
There are two volumes of transcripts of proceedings in this case. For ease of
reference, citations to the transcripts are made herein with regard to the volume of the
transcripts. Volume 1 of the transcripts of proceedings refers to the volume of
transcripts containing the motion in limine hearing held on November 9, 2007; the entry
of plea hearing held on November 30, 2007; the sentencing hearing held on March 28,
2008; and the rider review hearing held on October 3, 2008. Volume 2 of the transcripts
of proceedings refers to the volume of transcripts containing the scheduling hearing
held on August 28,2007.
The State also presented several exhibits during this hearing. The first two exhibits
were the certifications of Officer Chleboski and his drug dog. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.25, Ls.6-20.)
The remaining exhibits are contained in the record, as they were attached Ms. Key's
Second Motion in Limine. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.48, L.13 - p.50, L.23; R., pp.46-49.)

'

Chleboski right before their car pulled onto the highway without signaling.

(Vol. 1

Tr., p.14, L.22 - p.15, L.17.) According to the officer, the car pulled off again at another
entrance to the abandoned mill and Officer Chleboski pulled in behind the car. (Vol. 1
Tr., p.15, Ls.18-25.)
Officer Chleboski identified the driver as Ms. Key. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.16, L.2 - p.17,
L.2.) Also in the car were Ms. Key's 15 year old son and two of her dogs. (Vol. 1
Tr., p.17, L.17 - p.18, L.16.) Once he came up to the car, the officer saw that neither
Ms. Key, nor her, son were wearing their seatbelts. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.17, Ls.17-20.) Officer
Chleboski decided to give Ms. Key a written warning for not wearing her seatbelt and for
entering the highway without signaling. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.17, L.25 - p.18, L.25.) The officer
went through the written citation with Ms. Key while they were both standing at the
officer's car. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.19, Ls.3 - 8.) He then told Ms. Key that she was free to
leave and she walked back to her car. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.19, Ls.1-2, 12-14.)
But the officer changed his mind, and he returned to Ms. Key's car a second
time. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.20, Ls.15-20.) Officer Chleboski asked Ms. Key if he could ask her a
question before she left. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.20, Ls.19-20.) He then asked if she would mind if
he searched her car using his drug dog. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.21, Ls. 9-10.) Officer Chleboski
represented that he would normally search the car for drugs using the drug dog during
any routine traffic stop. (Vol. ITr., p.21, Ls.12-17.) He also testified that he did not use
the drug dog earlier in his interaction with Ms. Key because of safety concerns given
that Ms. Key had two dogs of her own in her car. (Vol. ITr., p.21, Ls.19-21.)
Ms. Key expressed hesitation at letting the officer search her car, and told the
officer that she didn't understand why he was asking to search it. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.21, L.24

- p.22,

L.3.) She also mentioned that she had just gotten off of probation. (Vol. 1

Tr., p.22, Ls.5-6.) Officer Chleboski then asked Ms. Key to take her dogs out of the car
so he could have his dog search her car for any odor of drugs. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.22, Ls.710.)

Ms. Key once again told the officer that she didn't understand why Officer

Chleboski was asking to search her car for drugs, to which the officer replied that it was
for drug enforcement purposes and that he wanted to use his dog because he had "put
time and effort in training the dog," so he wanted to use it. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.22, Ls.11-18.)
A third time, Ms. Key repeated that she didn't understand why the officer kept
asking to search her car. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.23, Ls.1-2.) He then asked her to get into her
car, turn on the air conditioner, and then the'officer would perform the search. (Vol. 1
Tr., p.23, Ls.10-15.) Ms. Key relented and got in her car while Officer Chleboski
returned with his drug dog. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.23, Ls.16-22 )
The officer took the dog around the car. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.30, Ls.12-19.) The dog
alerted at the front of the car. (Vol. ITr., p.30, Ls.12-24.) Officer Chleboski then
ordered Ms. Key, her son, and her two dogs out of the car so he could search the
interior. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.30, L.25 - p.31, L.5.) Prior to getting out of the car, Ms. Key tried
to stuff some towels into a black backpack that was inside of her car. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.31,
L.23 - p.32, L.4.) The officer ordered her to leave the backpack alone and step away
from the vehicle. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.32, Ls.4-6.)
During the search of the car using the drug dog, the dog alerted on the contents
of the backpack. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.32, L.20 - p.33, L.18.) Underneath the towels inside of
the backpack was a large plastic bag containing a leafy green substance that appeared
to be consistent with marijuana. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.33, L.24 - p.34, L.3; p.35, Ls.9-11.)

Officer Chleboski immediately placed Ms. Key under arrest and called Detective Mike
Quintal for assistance. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.35, L.18 - p.36, L.8.)
Detective Quintal arrived between thirty and forty minutes later. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.36,
Ls.9-12.) When the detective arrived, he consulted with Officer Chleboski and looked
over the baggie containing what the officer believed to be marijuana. (Vol. ITr., p.45,
Ls.16-20.) Ms. Key was still handcuffed and in the officer's car. (Vol. ITr., p.45, Ls.2125; p.46, Ls.1-2.)

The detective then read Ms. Key her ~ i r a n d arights.
~

(Vol. 1

Tr., p.46, L.23 - p.47, L.2.) When questioned about the backpack containing what the
officers believed to be marijuana, Ms. Key admitted that the backpack was hers but
denied any knowledge of any drugs contained inside it. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.47, Ls.19-23.)
She also claimed ownership of another bag that contained what the officers suspected
was drug paraphernalia. (Vol. ITr., p.47, L.24 - p.48, L.3.) The officers also found a
pieces of paper with what appeared names and numbers and a piece of paper with the
web address of what the officers discovered was a web site offering advice on how to
pass drug tests.

(Vol. 1 Tr., p.48, L.13

-

p.50, L.23; p.54, Ls.2-5; R., pp.46-49.)

Detective Quintal testified that he believed some of these documents to be consistent
with drug ledgers for marijuana drug sales. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.51, L.22

- p.52,

L.5.) He

further testified that his estimate for the street value of an ounce of marijuana was
between $200 and $220 for an ounce. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.59, Ls.6-9.) According to the
State's Amended Information, Ms. Key was in possession of over five ounces of
marijuana at the time of her arrest. (R., p.25.)

Miranda V. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (2966).

The district court denied Ms. Key's motions in limine and motions to suppress.
(R., pp.66-74.) Pursuant to an I.C.R. I 1 binding piea agreement, Ms. Key agreed to
plead guilty to the charge of possession of marijuana in a quantity greater than three
ounces, and the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.68, L.16

- p.72,

L.3; R., pp.78-84.) The State agreed to drop its request for forfeiture of the

money that was found on Ms. Key's person when she was arrested, but would request
forfeiture of Ms. Key's car.

(R., pp.79-81.)

As part of this agreement, Ms. Key

specifically reserved the right to challenge the State's request for forfeiture of her
vehicle. (R., p.81.) There was nothing requiring the State to recommend an underlying
sentence, although the State agreed to recommend that the district court retain
jurisdiction over Ms. Key's case. (R., pp.78-84.)
At the sentencing hearing, the parties stipulated that the value of Ms. Key's car
was $1,500, but further noted for the record that Ms. Key had resewed the right,
pursuant to her plea agreement, to challenge the State's attempt to seek forfeiture of
the car. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.85, L.24

- p.86, L.6.)

The State also informed the district court

that it was relying on the testimony provided at the hearing on Ms. Key's suppression
motions, and the material contained in the presentence investigation report, in support
of its forfeiture claim; but that the State would not provide any additional evidence in
support. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.86, Ls.7-14.)
At this same sentencing hearing, the State also presented its argument in favor
of forfeiture, although defense counsel appears to have been surprised that the matter
of the forfeiture would be heard at that time. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.91, Ls.8-21, p.92, Ls.21-24.)
The crux of the State's argument was that, because the backpack containing marijuana

was found within Ms. Key's car, the car was being used to transport, and thereby
facilitate, the possession. (Vol. ITr., p.91, Ls.8-22.) Ms. Key responded that the only
offense that she admitted to was simple possession, and that there was not any
evidence that the car was used to facilitate this offense. (Vol. ITr., p.93, Ls.1-12.)
The district court sentenced Ms. Key to five years, with two years fixed, and
retained jurisdiction for 180 days. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.102, Ls.2-9; R., p.96-97.) The court
took the matter of the criminal forfeiture of Ms. Key's car under advisement. (Vol. 1
Tr., p.103, Ls.6-16.) Ms. Key was eventually placed on probation for five years. (Vol. 1
Tr., p.108, L.14 - p.109, L.1; R., pp.116-120) Thereafter, the district court entered an
order of civil forfeiture granting the State's request for forfeiture of Ms. Key's car.
(R., pp.125-128.) Ms. Key timely appeals from the district court's order forfeiting her
vehicle.

ISSUES
1.

Was Ms. Key's constitutional right to a jury trial, pursuant to Article 1, 5 7 of the
Idaho State Constitution, violated when the issue of whether the State was
entitled to forfeiture of Ms. Key's vehicle was tried before the district court judge,
despite the fact that Ms. Key never waived her right to a jury determination of this
issue?

2.'

Was Ms. Key's constitutional right to a jury trial, pursuant to the Sixth
Amendment of the United States constitution, violated when the issue of whether
the State was entitled to forfeiture of Ms. Key's vehicle was tried before the
district court judge, despite the fact that Ms. Key never waived her right to a jury
determination of this issue?

3.

Did the district court err when it failed to make a determination, pursuant to
I.C.§37-2809, whether the size of the property forfeited was unfairly
disproportionate to the size of the property actually used in the commission of
Ms. Key's underlying offense?

4.

Did the district court's order forfeiting Ms. Key's vehicle violate the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against excessive fines?

5.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it determined that Ms. Key's
vehicle was used to commit or facilitate her offense of possession of marijuana?

ARGUMENT

1.
Ms. Kev's Constitutional Right To A Jurv Trial, Pursuant To Article 1. S 7 Of The ldaho
State Constitution. Was Violated When The lssue Of Whether The State Was Entitled
To Forfeiture Of Ms. Kev's Vehicle Was Tried Before The District Court Judae, Despite
The Fact That Ms. Kev Never Waived Her Riqht To A Jurv Determination Of This lssue
A.

Introduction
The right to a jury trial in statutory forfeiture actions was recognized at common

law at the time of the adoption of the ldaho Constitution in 1889. As such, the ldaho
Constitution recognizes a right to jury trial for statutory forfeiture actions. Because
Ms. Key never waived her right to a jury determination as to the forfeiture issue in this
case, her right to a jury trial pursuant to Article 1, 3 7 of the ldaho State Constitution was
violated when the issue of whether the State was entitled to criminal forfeiture of her
vehicle was tried before the district court
B.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews claims of a violation of the ldaho State constitutional right to a

jury trial de novo. See, e.g., State v. Sfover, 140 ldaho 927, 929, 104 P.3d 969, 971
(2005).

C.

Ms. Key's Constitutional Riaht To A Jurv Trial. Pursuant To Article 1, 6 7 Of The
ldaho State Constitution. Was Violated When The lssue Of Whether The State
Was Entitled To Forfeiture Of Ms. Kev's Vehicle Was Tried Before The District
Court Judqe, Despite The Fact That Ms. Key Never Waived Her Riqht To A Jury
Determination Of This lssue
As an initial matter, it does not appear from the record that Ms. Key objected to

the district court hearing the evidence and making the determination regarding whether

the State was entitled to forfeiture of her vehicle. However, Ms. Key asserts that this
issue is justiciable by this Court as a fundamental error that may be raised for the first
time on appeal.
While normally this Court will not consider issues raised for the first time on
appeal, an exception is made if the error complained of rises to the level of a
fundamental error. See e.g. State v. Contreras-Gonzales, 146 ldaho 41, 47, 190 P.3d
197, 203 (Ct. App. 2008). An error is fundamental if it relates to important constitutional
rights of the defendant, goes to the foundation of the case, or takes away from the
defendant a right which is essential to his or her defense and which no court ought to
permit the defendant to waive by mere silence. State v. Christiansen, 144 ldaho 463,
470, 163 P.3d 1175, 1182 (2007).

This Court determines whether an error is

fundamental on a case-by-case basis. Id.
A complete violation of the right to a jury trial, particularly given the specific and
stringent observation of this right under the ldaho State Constitution, is a fundamental
error. Article I , 3 7 of the ldaho State Constitution provides that the "right of trial by jury
shall remain inviolate," and further provides that, while a jury trial may be waived in a
criminal case, such waiver can only be made "by the consent of all parties, expressed in
open court," and waived in a manner that is proscribed by law. As noted by the ldaho
Supreme Court:
Our forefathers wisely provided in Article 1, Section 7 of the ldaho
Constitution: "The right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate..." They so
provided because they recognized that the jury system is the single most
important guardian of the people's right to be protected from oppressive
and overreaching government.

David Steed & Assoc., Inc. v. Young, 115 ldaho 247, 248, 766 P.2d 717, 718 (1988)
(overruled on ofher grounds by ldaho First Natg Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121
ldaho 266, 824 P.2d 841 (1991)).
The record reflects that Ms. Key was never apprised of her right to a jury
determination on the issue of forfeiture of her vehicle, and she expressly reserved the
right to challenge this forfeiture in her plea agreement. (R., p.81.) Given the strong
protections of the right to a jury determination under the ldaho constitution, this error
rises to the level of a fundamental error that is justiciable for the first time on appeal.
No ldaho court has yet addressed the issue of whether there exists a right to a
jury trial in criminal forfeiture actions. Resolution of the issue of whether there is a right
to a jury trial of a particular action under the ldaho State Constitution depends upon
whether that action was recognized under the common law at the time that the ldaho
Constitution was adopted in 1889. ldaho Depf. of Law Enforcement v. Free, 126 ldaho
422, 425, 885 P.2d 381, 384 (1994). This is because, "Article 1, § 7 of the ldaho
Constitution preserves the right to jury trial as it existed at the common law and under
the territorial statutes when the ldaho Constitution was adopted in 1889." Id.
Ms. Key acknowledges that the statute defining criminal forfeiture actions
indicates that there is no right to jury trial for such actions.

See I.C. § 37-2801.

However, the ldaho Supreme Court has previously addressed the right to a jury
pursuant to the ldaho Constitution in statutory forfeiture actions, and determined that
there is a constitutional right to jury trial in civil forfeiture actions. Free, 126 ldaho at
427, 885 P.2d at 386. And the Free Court reached this holding despite a statutory

provision indicating that there was no right to jury trial in civil forfeiture actions. Id.;
I.C. § 37-2744A(d).
The Free Court began by analyzing whether there was a constitutional right to
jury trial in statutory forfeiture actions at common law. After surveying the common law
analyses of this issue from other courts, the Free Court then determined that, "as of
1845 there was a right to jury trial in in rem forfeiture proceedings heard in common law
courts." Id. at 426, 885 P.2d at 385 (quoting in re Forfeiture of 1978 Chevrolet Van, 493
So.2d 433,436 (Fla. 1986)). Because all statutory forfeiture proceedings were afforded
the right to a jury trial at common law, the Free Court held:
It is uncontroverted that forfeitures existed, and were afforded a jury trial,
under English and American practice. In addition, Idaho's statutes
adopted the common law of England unless otherwise provided and
neither the Department nor independent research reveals any provision
limiting the right to jury trial in civil forfeiture actions. We find it unlikely,
given the general rule regarding forfeitures under the English and
American law, that ldaho held otherwise at the time it adopted its
Constitution. We hold, therefore, that there is a right to jury trial for
forfeiture proceedings under I.C. § 37-2744A because that right existed at
common law when the ldaho Constitution was adopted and that, to the
extent that I.C. 3 37-2744A denies such a right, it is unconstitutional.
Id. at 427. 995 P.2d at 386.

This same conclusion has been reached by numerous other courts confronted
with the issue of whether there is a state constitutional right to a jury trial for statutory
forfeiture actions. See, e.g., See State v. Twelve Thousand Dollars, 455 P.3d 858, 864
(Ok. Ct. App. 2007); State v. One 1969 Blue Ponfiac Firebird, 737 N.W.2d 271, 274-275
(S.D. 2007); see also U.S. v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 332 (1998) (finding that criminal
forfeitures were part of the punishment imposed for felonies in the Middle Ages and at
common law). In fact, more than one of these courts has noted that the right to a jury

trial at common law for statutory forfeiture actions was so well-documented that its
recognition is "inescapable." See Sfafe

v. Twelve

Thousand Dollars, 155 P.3d at 864;

State v. One 1969 Blue Ponfiac Firebird, 737 N.W.2d at 275.
Because there was a right to jury trial in statutory forfeiture actions at common
law at the time of the adoption of the ldaho Constitution, and in light of the fact that the
ldaho Supreme Court has already determined that there is a constitutional right to a jury
in the civil adjunct to criminal forfeiture actions, Ms. Key had a right to a jury
determination of whether the State was entitled to the forfeiture of her vehicle based
upon her conviction of possession of marijuana. To the extent that I.C. § 37-2801
conflicts with this right by asserting that the issue of criminal forfeiture is to be tried
solely before the district court, and not before a jury, this Court should give this
unconstitutional portion of the statute no force or effect. Free, 126 ldaho at 427, 885
P.2d at 386.
In this case, it appears that Ms. Key was never informed of her right to a jury trial
on the State's forfeiture motion, much less that she knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waived this right. A waiver of the right to a jury trial will be upheld only if the
entire record shows that such waiver was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
State v. Murphy, 125 ldaho 456, 456-457, 872 P.2d 719, 719-720 (1994). The record in
this case cannot support any such finding. Because Ms. Key never waived her right to
a jury determination as to whether the State was entitled to forfeiture of her vehicle, Ms.
Key's right to a jury trial pursuant to Article I , 3 7 of the ldaho State Constitution was
violated in this case.

Ms. Kev's Constitutional Riqht To A Juw Trial. Pursuant To The Sixth Amendment Of
The United States Constitution. Was Violated When The Issue Of Whether The State
Was Entitled To Forfeiture Of Ms. Kev's Vehicle Was Tried Before The District Court,
Despite The Fact That Ms. Key Never Waived Her Rinht To A Juw Determination Of
This Issue
A.

Introduction
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial applies to any fact which increases the

punishment that a defendant may face based upon the commission of an offense. In
this case, there were two factual showings that were required before the additional
penalty of forfeiture could be imposed on Ms. Key based upon her commission of the
underlying offense of possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces: first, that
Ms. Key's vehicle was used in the commission, or facilitated the commission, of her

underlying offense of possession of marijuana; and second, that forfeiture of the vehicle
was proportionate to her offense. These facts were not admitted by Ms. Key as part of
her underlying plea agreement, nor did she expressly waive her right to a jury
determination of these facts. As such, the determination of these facts by the district
court in imposing the additional criminal punishment of forfeiture violated Ms. Key's
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.

6.

Standard Of Review
Constitutional issues are questions of law that this Court reviews de novo. See,

e.g., State v. Grazian, 144 Idaho 510, 513, 164 P.3d 790, 793 (2007).

C.

Ms. Kev's Constitutional Right To A Jury Trial. Pursuant To The Sixth
Amendment Of The United States Constitution, Was Violated When The lssue Of
Whether The State Was Entitled To Forfeiture Of Ms. Kev's Vehicle Was Tried
Before The District Court, Despite The Fact That Ms. Key Never Waived Her
Right To A Jury Determination Of This lssue
As previously noted, certain errors, known as fundamental errors, are reviewable

on appeal regardless of whether these errors were actually raised before the district
court. See, e.g., Sfate v. Bingham, 116 ldaho 415, 423, 776 P.2d 424, 432 (1989).
"Error that is fundamental must be such error as goes to the foundation or basis of a
defendant's rights or must go to the foundation of the case or take from the defendant a
right which was essential to his defense and which no court could or ought to permit him
to waive. Each case will of necessity, under such a rule, stand on its own merits." Id.
(quoting State v. Garcia, 128 P.2d 459, 462 (N.M. 1942).
A direct violation of an important constitutional right may constitute a fundamental
error that is reviewable by this Court for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., State v.
Kenner, 121 ldaho 594, 597, 826 P.2d 1306, 1309 (1992) (finding that allegation that
district court violated constitutional right against self-incrimination is allegation of a
fundamental error); State v. Yakovic, 145 ldaho 437, 442, 180 P.3d 476, 481 (2008)
(fundamental error not shown when alleged error did not violate a fundamental right);
Sfafe v. Christiansen, 144 ldaho 463, 470, 163 P.3d 1175, 1182 (2007) (alleged
violation based on defendant's exercise of Fourth Amendment rights is fundamental
error); State v. Timmons, 145 ldaho 279, 291, 178 P.3d 644, 656 (Ct. App. 2007);
Minfun v. State, 144 ldaho 656, 661, 168 P.3d 40, 45 (Ct. App. 2007) (presuming for
purposes of appeal that violation of Confrontation Clause is allegation of fundamental
error).

The centrality of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a right to a jury trial cannot
be overstated.

In fact, this right is so important that the U.S. Supreme Court has

declared that its denial constitutes a structural error. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S.
275, 281-282 (1993). As noted by the Sullivan Court, the right to a jury trial is a basic
protection, without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function, and which
reflects "a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and
justice administered." Id. (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151 (1968)).
Based upon the importance of this constitutional right, the deprivation of Ms. Key's right
to a jury trial, as provided under the Sixth Amendment of the federal constitution, rises
to the level of a fundamental error.
Under the Sixth Amendment, any fact, other than a prior criminal conviction,
which increases the maximum range of punishment that a defendant may receive for a
criminal offense must be submitted to the jury and proved by the State beyond a
reasonable doubt. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004); Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,490 (2000); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684,697-703 (1975). In
light of these constitutional holdings, ldaho cases have recognized that any fact that a
jury would have to find in order to increase the range of punishment faced by the
defendant must be treated as an element of the offense for purposes of pleading and
proof. See, e.g., State v. Gerardo, 147 ldaho 22, 30, 205 P.3d 671, 679 (Ct. App.
2009).
While the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed, and rejected, the assertion that
there is a Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination in criminal forfeiture actions,
the Court's basis for doing so has since been disavowed by the Supreme Court.

Libretti v. U.S., 516 U.S. 29, 48-49 (1995). The Libretti Court rendered its decision
several years before the holdings in Blakely and Apprendi, and the Libretti Opinion is
based upon the exact rationale disavowed by these subsequent opinions.
The basis for the holding in Libretti that there was not a Sixth Amendment right to
jury trial in criminal forfeiture actions was the Court's distinction between elements of an
offense that demonstrate the defendant's guilt and facts that form the basis of
sentencing determinations. Libretti, 516 U.S. at 48-49. The Libretti Court held that,
"Our cases have made abundantly clear that a defendant does not enjoy a constitutional
right to a jury determination as to the appropriate sentence to be imposed." Id. at 49.
The Court relied for this proposition on case law stating that, "there is no Sixth
Amendment right to jury sentencing, even where the sentence turns upon specific
findings of fact." Id. (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S 79, 93 (1986)).
The basis for Libretti's rationale - that there is absolutely no right to jury findings
of fact with regard to sentencing issues

- has been clearly disavowed.

In fact, the

Apprendi Court expressly limited McMillan, the case primarily relied upon in Libretti, to
only those cases that do not involve imposition of a sentence more severe than is
available based solely on the jury's verdict. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 486-487 n.13. In its
place stand the holdings of Blakely and Apprendi, which are the legal standards that
should be applied by this Court in determining whether Ms. Key had a Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial as to the State's forfeiture request. Under the Blakely and Apprendi
standards, Ms. Key's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated in this case.
There were key factual findings that were required before the district court was
permitted by law to impose the additional criminal penalty of forfeiture against Ms. Key:

first, that Ms. Key's vehicle was used in the commission, or facilitated the commission,
of her underlying offense of possession of marijuana; and second, that forfeiture of the
vehicle was proportionate to her offense - i.e. that the size of the property forfeited was
not unfairly disproportionate to the size of the property actually used in the commission
of her offense. I.C. 33 37-2801, 37-2809. Ms. Key never admitted to these facts in her
plea agreement. In fact, her agreement carried with it the express condition that she
resewed the right to challenge the State's forfeiture claim against her car. (R., p.81.)
Ms. Key also never expressly waived her right to a jury determination as to these facts.
Because these were factual findings that increased the maximum punishment that the
district court could impose for Ms. Key's offense, Ms. Key's right to a jury trial was
violated when the forfeiture issue was tried before the district court rather than to a jury.

The District Court Erred When It Failed To Make A Determination, Pursuant To
I.C. 6 37-2809, Whether The Size Of The Propertv Forfeited Was Unfairly
DisproportionateTo The Size Of The Propertv Actuallv Used In The Commission Of
Ms. Kev's Underlvina Offense
A.

Introduction
Under Idaho's statutory scheme establishing criminal forfeiture actions, forfeiture

is available as a criminal sanction only if the size of the property forfeited is not "unfairly
disproportionate to the size of the property actually used in violation of the provisions of
this chapter."

I.C.

3 37-2809. The district court in this case failed to follow this

mandatory legal standard when the court entered a forfeiture order without making any
determination as to whether this property was proportionate to her offense under the
standards of proportionality outlined in I.C. § 37-2809.

B.

Standard of Review
In reviewing a district court's determination in'a criminal forfeiture action brought

pursuant to I.C.

3 37-2801, this court defers to the district court's findings of fact where

they are supported by substantial and competent evidence, but reviews issues of
statutory construction de novo. State v. Stevens, 139 ldaho 670, 674-675, 84 P.3d
1038, 1042-1043 (Ct. App. 2004). Statutes authorizing the forfeiture of property are
strictly construed against the State. See State v. Twelve Thousand Dollars, 155 P.3d at
861.
C.

The District Court Erred When It Failed To Make A Determination, Pursuant To
I.C. 5 37-2809, Whether The Size Of The Property Forfeited Was Unfairly
Disproportionate To The Size Of The Property Actually Used In The Commission
Of Ms. Key's Underlying Offense
By statute, the size of the property that the State may be permitted to take in a

forfeiture action is limited to the extent to which that property constituted an
instrumentality of the offense. ldaho Code

3 37-2809 provides that the "size of the

property forfeited shall not be unfairly disproportionate to the size of the property
actually used in violation of the provisions of this chapter."

I.C. ?j
37-2809. This

provision is a codification of what is sometimes referred to as the "instrumentalities test"
for the excessiveness of a forfeiture.
The instrumentalities test has been described in Justice Scalia's dissent in
Austin v. U.S., 509 U.S. 602, 627-629 (1993) (J. Scalia, dissenting). The proportionality
of forfeitures under this test is fixed, "not by determining the appropriate value of the
penalty in relation to the committed offense, but by determining what property has been

'tainted' by unlawful use." Id. at 627. In further explaining how such determinations are
made, Justice Scalia writes:

... an in rem forfeiture goes beyond the traditional limits that the Eighth
Amendment permits if it applies to property that cannot be properly
regarded as an instrument of the offense - the building, for example, in
which an isolated drug sale happens to occur. Such a confiscation would
be an excessive fine. The question is not how much the confiscated
property is worth, but whether the confiscated property has a close
enough relationship to the offense.
Id. at 627-628.

As such, under this test, the central question is the degree to which the property
has been put to use in unlawful activity. It is also important to note that Idaho's statutory
instrumentality test for proportionality must be met in addition to, rather than in lieu of,
the constitutional test for gross disproportionality. See, e.g., Miller v. One 2001 Pontiac
Aztek, 669 N.W.2d 893, 896-897 n.2, (Minn. 2003). Because the Idaho legislature has
chosen to adopt a particular showing of proportionality, in addition to those standards
that are mandated under the federal constitution, both standards should be given effect
by this Court.
Here, there has been no determination of how much of Ms. Key's car was
"actually used" in her underlying offense of possession of marijuana. Moreover, the
State was seeking permanent deprivation of Ms. Key's car for what was, at best, a
tangential and fleeting relationship between Ms. Key's vehicle and her underlying
offense of a single instance of possessing marijuana. This is analogous to the example
brought forth by Justice Scalia of the unreasonableness of seeking forfeiture of an entire
building based upon a single use of that building to sell drugs. Given the very limited
scope of relation or nexus between Ms. Key's car and her underlying offense of

possession of marijuana, the permanent forfeiture of her car was an unfairly
disproportionate forfeiture in relation to the size of the property actually used in her
underlying offense.

The District Court's Order Forfeiting Ms. Kev's Vehicle Violated The Eighth Amendment
Prohibition Against Excessive Fines
A.

Introduction
Ms. Key asserts that the forfeiture of her vehicle was a grossly disproportionate

punishment in relation her underlying offense of possession of marijuana. Therefore,
the district court's order granting the State's motion seeking forfeiture violated her
Eighth Amendment rights protecting against excessive fines.
8.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews the issue of whether a forfeiture order was unconstitutionally

excessive under the Eighth Amendment prohibition against excessive fines de novo.
Bajakajian, 534 U.S. at 336-337; Nez Perce County Prosecuting Atty. v. Reese, 142
Idaho 893, 897, 136 P.3d 364, 368 (Ct. App. 2006); Von Hoff v. U S . , 492 F.3d 175, 181
(2nd Cir. 2007).
C.

District Court's Order Grantinq The State's Motion Seeking Forfeiture Of
Ms. Key's Vehicle Violated The Eiahth Amendment Prohibition Aqainst Excessive

Fines
The Eighth Amendment provides that, "[elxcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
AMEND.VIII.

The Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment restricts the

government's power to extract payments, including payments in kind.

Reese, 142

ldaho at 898, 136 P.3d at 369. Forfeitures are payments in kind and, thus, are fines
that are subject to Eighth Amendment review if they constitute punishments for an
offense. Id.
There can be no meaningful dispute that a criminal forfeiture order entered
pursuant to I.C. § 37-2801 is a punishment. The title for the chapter of the code section
that authorizes such forfeitures is titled, "Criminal Forfeitures," indicating that this mode
of forfeiture is intended as part of punishments available for a criminal offense. Such
forfeitures are only available against a defendant who has pleaded guilty or been found
guilty of a drug offense pursuant to the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, and the
forfeiture order is to be made "in addition to any other sentence imposed" for such
offense. I.C. § 37-2801. In addition, the ldaho legislature has made provisions for an
"innocent owner defense" for third parties with an interest in the property, which is an
important indication that the criminal forfeiture statute is intended as punishment. See
Reese, 142 ldaho at 898, 136 P.3d at 369; State v. Twelve Thousand Dollars, 155 P.3d
858, 863 (Ok.Ct. App. 2007); I.C. § 37-2807. As such, a criminal forfeiture order
constitutes punishment for purposes of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
excessive fines.
Moreover, the ldaho Supreme Court and ldaho Court of Appeals have both
already determined that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against excessive fines
applies in the context of civil forfeiture actions, in which there is not even a direct
requirement of any underlying conviction of a criminal offense in support of the
forfeiture. Free, 126 ldaho at 423-425, 885 P.2d at 382-384; Reese, 142 ldaho at 898-

899, 136 P.3d at 369-370. This is in accord with the holdings of the United States
Supreme Court, which has held that a forfeiture that is imposed at the culmination of
criminal proceedings as a result of a conviction constitutes punishment for purposes of
invoking the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at
327-328.
The standard for determining whether the amount of forfeiture ordered by the
district court was excessive, and therefore constitutes a violation of the Eighth
Amendment, is whether the forfeiture order is "grossly disproportionate" to the gravity of
the underlying offense. Bajakajian, 534 U.S. at 336-337. This is the same standard of
gross disproportionality that is otherwise employed in case law dealing with cruel and
unusual punishments. Id.

"The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the

Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality - the amount of the forfeiture
must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense it is designed to punish.'' Id. at
334; Reese, 142 ldaho at 899,136 P.3d at 370.
The inquiry as to proportionality is a factually intensive determination that
requires the court to consider a variety of factors. Among these are: the gravity of the
offense; the overall culpability of the offender; the harm caused in the commission of the
offense; the value of the property

- including its

intangible value to the owner; the

hardship that deprivation of that property would work to the defendant; the overall effect
of the forfeiture on the defendant's family or financial circumstances; and the
relationship between the offense and the property, including the importance and extent
of the use of the property in the underlying offense. Bajakajian, 534 U.S. at 339; Reese,
142 Idaho at 899-900, 136 P.3d at 370-371; Von Hofe, 492 F.3d at 182. "Remand is

required where the trial court relies on one factor without evaluating the import of other
relevant factors for determining whether forfeiture is excessive." Reese, 142 Idaho at
899, 136 P.3d at 370.
In this case, the district court never made any determination as to whether the
forfeiture of Ms. Key's vehicle was proportionate to her offense. (R., pp.125-128.) In
failing to do so, the district court did not act consistently with applicable legal standards,
both statutory and constitutional, that require that any forfeiture order be proportionate
to the defendant's underlying offense. Because the district court failed to weigh the
proportionality of the forfeiture order to the nature of her underlying offense, this Court
should vacate the district court's order granting the State's motion to forfeit Ms. Key's
vehicle, and remand this case for further proceedings.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Determined That Ms. Kev's Vehicle
Was Used To Commit Or Facilitate Her Offense Of Possession Of Mariiuana
A.

Introduction
Ms. Key asserts that the State failed to meet its burden to establish that her

vehicle was used to facilitate the commission of her underlying offense of possession of
marijuana in an amount greater than three ounces. As such, the district court erred
when it granted the State's motion for forfeiture of Ms. Key's vehicle.
B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing a district court's determination in a criminal forfeiture action brought

pursuant to I.C. 9 37-2801, this court defers to the district court's findings of fact where

they are supported by substantial and competent evidence, but reviews issues of
statutory construction de novo. Stevens, 139 ldaho at 674-675, 84 P.3d at 1042-1043.
Statutes authorizing the forfeiture of property are strictly construed against the State.
See State v. Twelve Thousand Dollars. 155 P.3d at 861.
C.

The District Court Erred When It Determined That Ms. Kev's Vehicle Was Used
To Commit Or Facilitate Her Offense Of Possession Of Marijuana
ldaho Code § 37-2801 provides in pertinent part that:
Any person who is found guilty of, who enters a plea of guilty, or who is
convicted of a violation of the uniform controlled substances act, chapter
27, title 37, ldaho Code, punishable by imprisonment for more than one
(I)
year, no matter the form of the judgment or order withholding
judgment, shall forfeit to the state of ldaho:
(2) Any of the person's property used, or intended to be used, in
any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of
such violation.

I.C. § 37-2801
The criminal forfeiture statute is significantly more limited in scope than the civil
forfeiture statute - unlike a civil forfeiture brought pursuant to I.C.

3 37-2744, criminal

forfeiture is limited solely to property that facilitated the specific crime for which the
defendant has been convicted. Stevens, 139 ldaho at 675, 84 P.3d at 1043. Therefore,
in order for the State to succeed in a criminal forfeiture action, the State must prove a
relationship between the property at issue and the defendant's specific crime. Id.
With regards to possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, the
Stevens court held, in dicta, that, had the evidence demonstrated that the defendant's
vehicle was used to acquire the drugs that were in the defendant's possession, the

requisite relationship between the vehicle and the drugs would be established for
purposes of permitting forfeiture that vehicle. Id.
In this case, the district court relied on Stevens in support of its forfeiture order.
(R., pp.127-128.)

However, the Stevens Court has indicated that, to establish the

required nexus under I.C.

3 37-2801, the vehicle must be somehow used in order to

purchase or otherwise acquire, and therefore come into possession of, the drugs that
are the subject of the defendant's crime. Stevens, 139 Idaho at 675, 84 P.3d at 1043.
The Stevens court also rejected the "slight nexus" test derived from federal civil
forfeiture actions, which required a much lesser showing of relation to the underlying

-

offense than does Idaho's criminal forfeiture statute. Id. Because the State in Sfevens
opted to seek criminal forfeiture, it "thereby assumed a more difficult burden to prove a
relationship between Steven's motorcycle and the specific offense of which he was
convicted." Id.
With regard to forfeitures of cars in particular, a direct and substantial connection
to the underlying criminal offense is required given the pervasive and ubiquitous
presence of cars in everyday life. See, e.g., Riley v. 1987 Station Wagon, 650 N.W.2d
441,445 (Minn. 2002). As noted by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Riley:
With respect to vehicular conveyances in particular, "common sense
dictates that the law require a substantially significant connection with
criminal activity before an ordinary automobile may be seized and forfeited
to the Government." The reason is that the use of the automobile in our
society is pervasive. A car by itself is not contraband and there is little
activity that the use of a car does not "facilitate" to some degree.
Id.

Here, the requisite relationship between Ms. Key's car and her underlying
offense was not established by the State. There was no proof that Ms. Key used her

car in order to acquire the drugs, thereby facilitating her possession. The State's sole
argument advanced in support of its forfeiture request was that the car was used as a
means of transporting the drugs, thereby facilitating its possession. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.91,
Ls.8-22.)

Without more, this is merely an allegation of fleeting and incidental

relationship between Ms. Key's possession of the drugs and the vehicle itself. Given
the heightened burden on the State in criminal forfeiture actions, this was insufficient to
establish the required relationship of a direct and substantial connection between
Ms. Key's car and her offense of possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces.
As such, Ms. Key asks that this Court reverse, with prejudice, the district court's order
granting the State's motion seeking forfeiture of her vehicle.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Key respectfully requests that this Court reverse with prejudice the district
court's order granting the State's motion seeking forfeiture of her vehicle.

In the

alternative, she respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
granting the State's motion seeking forfeiture of her vehicle, and remand this case for
further proceedings.
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